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THE USSR AND THE VULNERABILITY OF EMPIRE

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THE USSR AND THE VULNERABILITY OF EMPIRE

FOREWORD

While the outward thrust of Soviet policy this past decade has provided Moscow with strategic benefits, it has also created vulnerabilities and tensions for the USSR that in some respects resemble those the United States and its allies have had to confront since the mid-1950s. Over the past generation the Soviet Union has been able to seize the initiative in chipping away at exposed Western positions of influence. But in recent years Moscow has had to contend more with the vexing problem of protecting its longstanding grip on Eastern Europe and has had to deal with heightened local resistance and suspicions produced by the expansion of Soviet pressures beyond the heartland of Central Europe.

This changed circumstance affords the West an opportunity to attempt to inhibit further expansionist activities by the USSR and in some measure to exert pressure on its exposed positions of influence. Such Western initiatives might, of course, entail numerous risks, which would have to be carefully weighed against the benefits of possible moves. This study explores some possible alternative approaches the West could theoretically take, and discusses the key opportunities and risks that would be inherent in any such conflict arenas. No attempt is made to conclude which approaches would be more desirable from the US perspective.

This is the first of a new series of informal NIC/AG studies issued by the Analytic Group of the National Intelligence Council. It was prepared to offer certain propositions for discussion. It has been discussed with officers of the National Foreign Assessment Center and within the National Intelligence Council. Its views, however, remain those of its authors, [redacted] and [redacted], of the NIC Analytic Group. They welcome comments on the propositions in this study ([redacted])

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DISCUSSIONThe Rising Cost of Empire

1. Like an overanxious chess player, Moscow, in advancing its pieces in different directions (e.g., Indochina, Africa, Central America), has exposed lines of attack to its adversary, placed advanced pawns in jeopardy, and acquired positions that it must defend at high cost. The political-economic costs of empire and of enhanced global influence unquestionably have been increasing for the Soviets. Although these costs do not yet seem to have caused Moscow to modify significantly any of its principal lines of assertive behavior in the world, Soviet experience in the wake of the Afghanistan invasion may be having some impact on restraining actions against Poland. The current costs of empire are likely to become increasingly painful for Soviet leaders over the next five years or so, in large measure because of growing economic difficulties. Additional imperial costs, whether voluntary or imposed, would hasten the time when Moscow must make tough trade-off choices between pursuing overseas adventures and reducing economic stringencies at home. Although this trend of increasing imperial costs is clear, it is impossible to know precisely when the Soviets will perceive the need to make these choices.

2. The political costs incurred by the Soviets are already growing. The invasion of Afghanistan has produced a serious anti-Soviet backlash throughout the Muslim world and has somewhat hardened European and Japanese attitudes toward Moscow. The Soviet involvement in Vietnam has created anxieties in the ASEAN countries and in China and Japan; and Soviet/Cuban inroads into Angola, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Central America have stirred strong feelings against Moscow among neighbors and close associates of the United States.

3. Although the financial costs of empire for Moscow have risen dramatically, they are now just becoming burdensome. The Soviets' largest and most rapidly growing cost has been a loss in hard currency earnings that has resulted from economic largess to Eastern Europe and Cuba. Moscow has been providing these countries with oil at below-world-market prices since 1973 and has been paying Cuba for its sugar at prices exceeding that on the global market. Although by 1980 these subsidies had reached some \$20 billion, the Soviets have been able to accept painlessly this loss in foreign exchange. They have been earning sufficient foreign exchange to pay for desired imports of foodstuffs and technology. Moscow also has been paying little attention to the idea of abandoning its politically inspired trade subsidy policy in order to build up foreign exchange reserves to meet some

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future period of stringent financial conditions or to relieve ongoing consumer shortages.

4. Although economic and military assistance to its allies (Eastern Europe, Cuba, Vietnam, North Korea, Afghanistan) other than subsidies jumped from about \$1 billion in 1970 to some \$4 billion in 1980, these additional outlays so far have placed relatively little strain on the Soviet economy. The 1980 expenditures amounted to less than 0.5 percent of Soviet GNP and included mainly goods that the Soviets produce in relatively abundant quantities, such as food-processing equipment. Aid elsewhere has had even less of a domestic economic impact. Economic assistance to other LDCs amounts to only \$500-600 million a year, and even that minimal amount has been self-supporting since 1973, when repayments began to top new aid. The \$6 billion or so a year in military goods and assistance delivered to LDCs in recent years has been 90 percent covered by cash sales to oil-rich countries (such as Libya) or by repayments.

5. The currently unfolding Soviet economic situation, however, could make Moscow consider more carefully the continuation of its policies of trading off foreign exchange losses (mainly on oil) for the political benefits derived from supplying Eastern Europe and Cuba with subsidized commodities. Moscow is already concerned about its deteriorating foreign exchange position due to the continuing need for vast quantities of imported grain and to the slack in exports to the West. Within a few years the Soviets will be running a large deficit on their hard currency trade flows if, as expected, oil exports to the West fall off dramatically because of stagnating Soviet oil production and increasing domestic oil demand. To ensure sufficient foreign exchange earnings to buy needed grain and wanted technology, Moscow will in any event probably have to make hard decisions on substantially reducing the flow of subsidized oil.

6. These already rising political and expected economic burdens of empire will become especially onerous because of Moscow's pressing domestic economic difficulties and aging leadership. Potential competitors for power will be less able to ignore the political and economic implications of empire as the USSR approaches a period of leadership transition. Competitors may seek to disassociate themselves from domestic economic hardship and would have less personally at stake in the foreign adventures of Brezhnev.

Potential Western Approaches

7. General. As a start in exploring the possible vehicles for exploiting the vulnerabilities of the Soviet empire, it seems most valuable to compare two broad alternative approaches.

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Although both approaches have or are being employed in one form or another, the increasing Soviet vulnerability may make each more useful.

8. The first, the "attrition" approach, centers on raising the costs to the USSR of the most exposed of Soviet positions of influence; that is, it aims not so much at forcing the Soviets out of their strongholds as at pushing them further into quagmires like that in which the United States found itself in Vietnam. The means include a variety of pressures, including the provision of training, arms, and advice to anti-Soviet or antiregime elements. In most cases, the effort requires only modest levels of assistance and could best be carried out by subtle and covert means. The "attrition" approach has several advantages:

- It is relatively inexpensive in financial terms.
- It is not passive but active: an activist policy which seizes the initiative and turns the USSR's very presence against it, by pressuring it into repressive overreaction and burdensome overcommitment.
- It accords well with Chinese policy to counter Soviet "hegemony."
- It would push Moscow toward a dilemma heretofore pretty much the monopoly of the United States: that of having to choose between underwriting the costs of increasingly unviable regimes or reducing the Soviet political presence (or influence) in the affected country.

Such an approach, however, would assure increasing the client regime's dependence on the USSR and leaving the regime little alternative to inviting the Soviets to increase their presence and, therefore, their influence on the scene. An "attrition" approach would also tend to:

- Increase tensions between the West and the Soviets.
- Entail risks of broadening local conflicts.
- Invite reciprocal measures against US friends.
- Alienate segments of the Third World that do not wish the East-West struggle to impinge upon them.

9. "Dependency reduction," the second general approach, by contrast would center on efforts to woo client regimes from the USSR by offering local Soviet allies and friends the prospect of attractive political and economic benefits in the event that Soviet influence and the Soviet presence were markedly reduced.

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This approach requires patience and a willingness to coexist, at least temporarily, with Soviet bastions of influence; but, unlike the "attrition" approach, it aims at the ultimate expulsion of Soviet influence from a region, increasing the independence of Soviet clients, and perhaps even creating a certain measure of dependence by them on the West. The advantages of this approach would be to:

- Emphasize the use of economic and cultural resources with which the West is well endowed, taking advantage of the fact that the USSR is poorly equipped to stimulate and sustain economic growth in a postrevolutionary period.
- Run less risk than the "attrition" approach of political or military confrontation with the Soviets, at least in the short run.
- Accord better with the preferences of major US allies in Western Europe, also offering significant prospects of evolving joint strategy with them.

However, this approach would promise few short-term benefits to the United States, might prove to be expensive in the long term, and might create perceptions in Moscow that the West will not oppose Soviet opportunism with vigor.

10. Because Soviet expansionism has taken a variety of forms, has occurred in significantly diverse areas, and entails situations that are starkly different, no approach of course can be applied in a "pure" fashion. Nor could the two general approaches easily be wedded in individual situations (even though some of their elements could be combined in differing proportions), because the first would increase a client's dependence on the USSR whereas the second would be explicitly fashioned to reduce this dependence.

11. Mention should be made also of other approaches. At one extreme might be the possibility that a purposeful "no action" strategy would be most prudent for the United States. For example, in a few instances the USSR may already be sufficiently mired so that US efforts would neither attract local leaders nor add substantially to Moscow's woes, while actually exacerbating local suspicions of US intentions. At the other extreme is the possibility of openly coercing a Soviet client with the avowed purpose of altering its political orientation. Such a course, obviously, could be pursued only rarely, and in carefully tailored fashion, because it would run the risk of confrontation with the USSR, might produce the very proregime "backlash" within the client that is not desired (and consequently seldom succeeds), and might injure other US equities in the world.

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12. Specific Examples of Approaches. To illustrate the possible utility of these various approaches, we examine briefly advantages and disadvantages in a number of key cases-- Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Angola, Cuba, Vietnam, Eastern Europe (especially Poland), South Yemen, and Libya. In each case, the following factors are examined to determine which approaches might be most effective:

-- A largely "attrition" approach would seem most feasible if:

- The presence of the Red Army or proxy forces makes it difficult for the West to woo local leaders and increases the number of tempting targets for local dissident groups.
- The client society is deeply cleaved along political, tribal, or ethnic lines (as in Angola) or if strong anti-Soviet elements already exist (as in Afghanistan and Syria).

-- A largely "dependence reduction" approach would seem most feasible if:

- Local government leaders are popular, have been thrust forward by local nationalism, and discern the inability of Moscow to serve effectively the postrevolutionary needs of their societies.
- Soviet influence is largely the consequence of an ephemeral compatibility of interests with the client such as mutual hostility to a third party.

13. Finally, any approach chosen for one case would, of course, have consequences for others. For example, a largely "attrition" approach against Cuba, aimed at raising the cost of its foreign adventures, would be likely to conflict with the prospect for using an effective "dependence reduction" approach in the cases of Nicaragua, Angola, or Ethiopia. Actions to bog down the Cubans also might provoke a harsh Soviet response in the case of Poland. Moscow might feel less restrained if it perceives increased Western support for groups creating troubles in the Soviet sphere of control. Also, even though a largely "dependence reduction" approach in the case of Poland might assist that country's aim of preserving its fragile independence from Moscow, it might relieve the USSR of future political and economic burdens.

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Specific Countries

14. Afghanistan has been recognized by Western observers as the clearest case for a largely "attrition" approach. The Red Army is already mired in the country, and there is no realistic prospect for pressuring the USSR to get out. Local leaders are Soviet creations who could not shift their loyalties. Whatever the interests of the Afghan state, the regime is so closely identified with Moscow that a withdrawal of the Soviet presence would probably spell its demise. Finally, the major tribal groupings of the country, though as yet unable to weld themselves into a single force, are all bitterly opposed to the USSR. Selective Western military assistance to the most successful of these anti-Soviet groups (such as the provision of antiaircraft missiles) combined with persistent public and political pressure on Moscow (possibly through increased support for pro-Afghan demonstrations in the West and Third World and more vociferous denunciations of Moscow at the United Nations and other international forums) might raise costs to the USSR and intensify Moscow's quandary: no-win, withdrawal, or escalated conflict.

15. If the United States were to decide to intensify its activities against Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, this might boost the US image among moderate Muslim states and China. The most serious risk of such an effort would be in the form of heightened Soviet pressures against and/or limited cross-border incursions into Pakistan. Given its difficulties in Afghanistan, Moscow probably would not undertake a military offensive against Pakistan which would entail occupying portions of that country's territory. But to counter the possibility of significantly tougher Soviet moves would require a stiffening of Islamabad's political resolve by the provision of increased amounts of military hardware and active diplomatic support. Such enhanced US support probably would be necessary even if there were no stepped-up support for the Afghan rebels, because Moscow's frustration with its Afghanistan venture would be likely to persist no matter what the United States did. The impact on India of such assistance to Pakistan, of course, would have to be weighed.

16. Ethiopia presents a much more ambiguous case for "attrition" than Afghanistan. Somali and Eritrean elements might offer tempting potential instruments if an "attrition" approach were invoked, although in a few years the situation may change to one where a longer term "dependence reduction" approach might be more profitable. For the near future, increased small-scale, indirect, clandestine support for local insurgent groups and dissidents (for example, the Ethiopian People's Liberation Front, the Eritrean Liberation Front, and the Tigrays) would tend to increase tensions among the various ethnic groups in Ethiopia and between the Ethiopians and the Soviet/Cubans. The Soviets and their friends would find themselves becoming more entangled in

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another unruly and seemingly endless situation that could significantly raise the cost to them of maintaining their presence. Such an approach might also alter the present state of affairs, where Moscow has achieved the most that it can reasonably expect from the circumstances. Failing a rapid political settlement of the Ogaden and Eritrean conflicts (a highly doubtful outcome), the Soviets might prefer to maintain a manageable level of political tension and guerrilla fighting that would perpetuate Ethiopian dependence on Soviet military assistance but avoid a confrontation with the United States. From the US viewpoint, despite the fact that the nationalism of Ethiopian leaders runs deeper than professions of Marxism-Leninism, there would be little chance at present wooing them away from the Soviets. Because Ethiopia is still in the midst of revolutionary turmoil, anti-US feeling is strong, and Addis Ababa seems to feel reasonably content with the Soviet presence despite some recent reports to the contrary. It is plausible, however, within a few years that the Mengistu or a similar regime might become disenchanted with Soviet-Cuban meddling and wish to encourage a greater Western presence.

17. There are more regional complexities in the case of Ethiopia than in that of Afghanistan, which would require that any resort to a basically "attrition" approach be undertaken with the utmost care and subtlety. Neither the Kenyans nor the Sudanese--both friendly to the United States--would look with favor on an upsurge in violence in the Horn of Africa. Kenya sees itself (along with Ethiopia) as a target of Somali irredentism. Sudanese President Nimeiri feels himself to be extremely vulnerable to Libyan subversion and terrorism, and Sudan would have to bear a still greater Ethiopian refugee burden than is already the case. Thus, any US decision to lend significant support to anti-Mengistu forces in Ethiopia would probably require:

- Considerable reliance on intermediaries such as the Saudis.
- Diplomatic efforts to persuade President Siad to renounce or water down Somali claims against Kenya.
- Sufficient collaboration with the French in Djibouti to shield that unstable country from any spillover of violence.
- A concerted international effort against the intrigues and adventures of the Libyans, and perhaps an improved international effort to deal with the burden of Ethiopian refugees in both Sudan and Somalia.
- Enthusiastic support by the new Moubarek regime in Egypt.

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- Guarantees to Sudan against Ethiopia or Libyan counter-pressures.

18. Angola is a case that would be susceptible to a mixture of approaches. On the one hand, the Soviets, East Germans, and Cubans already constitute an unpopular presence in the country, and Jonas Savimbi's UNITA is already a significant antiregime force. Any "attrition" approach would quickly raise direct costs for the USSR, as well as indirect costs in the form of further underwriting the Angolan economy and any further Cuban involvement in the region. The disadvantage would be a risk of losing Western oil investments and opportunities in Cabinda, and increased anti-Western agitation by some African states about indirect US support for South Africa. By contrast, a more "dependence reduction" approach would also carry pluses and minuses. The Soviets and their allies have already shown themselves to be ineffective in aiding Angolan economic development in contrast to the Western presence, particularly in the oil industry of Cabinda. Angolan leadership is clearly nationalist and may be susceptible to Western offers of assistance in return for a reduction of the Soviet and Cuban presence. A prerequisite, however, for the success of a "dependence reduction" approach would most likely be a UN-sponsored resolution resolving the Namibian situation. The obvious difficulty with this approach is that the Savimbi forces would have to be either disregarded or invited to participate in the government.

19. A blend of the two approaches might be feasible in the Angolan case. There might be some benefit if, for example, clandestine Western assistance to UNITA were gradually increased, while the possibility was suggested to Luanda of increased economic assistance from the West in exchange for a significant reduction in Communist personnel in the country and for bringing the Savimbi faction into the Luanda government. To back this effort, the West might simultaneously press for free elections (similar to those that took place in Zimbabwe) as the democratic means of halting the continuing bloodshed. By taking such a combined tack, the West might have a chance to achieve the best of both worlds. The Soviets and their friends could become mired in an interminable guerrilla conflict or their local influence could be greatly attenuated.

20. Cuba probably would not be amenable to a "dependence reduction" approach for the foreseeable future under a Castro regime:

- Although there are reasons for increased discontent in Cuba, there are no organized elements that could be turned against the regime.

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- Although Cuban interests diverge from Moscow's in many respects, there is a fundamental coincidence of interests and revolutionary aims that welds the two.
- Castro gives his revolutionary and political aspirations overseas a high priority even when they interfere with domestic economic considerations.

21. Also, although Cuba is relatively invulnerable to direct applications of an "attrition" approach, it would be peculiarly vulnerable to an indirect application of such an approach in Nicaragua and Africa. For instance, because Castro values the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua sufficiently to go to great lengths to preserve it, outside pressures against it would induce an ever-increasing Cuban commitment in that country. Pressures applied to the Cubans in Africa and Nicaragua would place further strains on Cuba's resources and would require the Soviets to underwrite still further the Cuban economy and military adventures. As the Cubans became still more committed to interventions overseas, they might lose further credibility in the nonaligned movement and provoke greater suspicions on the part of some countries that were previously sympathetic to Havana.

22. The significant difficulty with an "attrition" approach of this type toward Cuba is that it could come into conflict with a "dependence reduction" approach for Nicaragua, Angola, and Ethiopia. The issue would come down to whether priority were to be given to raising the costs to Cuba (and therefore indirectly to the USSR), or encouraging the independence of Nicaragua and those African governments. In the case of Nicaragua, an "attrition" approach also would mean that the United States would be accepting, at least temporarily, rather complete domination of Managua by Soviet-Cuban-Sandinista forces.

23. Vietnam. For the immediate future the "attrition" approach would seem more feasible in Vietnam. The leadership in Hanoi is fundamentally nationalist; and is looking to reduce the economic hardships and social strains that are the consequences of its mismanagement, its earlier conflict with the United States, its interventions in Cambodia and Laos, and its continuing confrontation with China. In a word, the Vietnamese economy is sorely tried and can ill afford continuing large-scale investments for national security. At the same time, elements in the Vietnamese leadership are casting about for alternatives to complete dependence on the Soviet Union. For these reasons, the "dependence reduction" approach (including US recognition of the Hanoi regime) might offer rewarding prospects in time for both reducing the military weight of the Vietnamese in Southeast Asia and encouraging a "Titoist" solution.

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24. A "dependence reduction" approach, nonetheless, would entail serious problems that might make such an effort questionable at this time:

- Such a US approach to Vietnam would be a major irritant in the more important Sino-American relationship.
- It would not necessarily reduce Vietnamese militance in the region, and the potential for increased Vietnamese strength would surely frighten the ASEAN countries.
- It would not necessarily reduce Soviet presence in the one instance that really counts, the strategic use of Vietnamese naval and air bases.

25. Under current circumstances a more "attrition" approach would seem to offer more advantages for the United States:

- It would be a major stimulant to Sino-American cooperation in Asia, and a signal to Beijing that the United States was prepared to parallel and support Chinese policy in that region.
- It would place immediate pressure on the Soviet Union in a region that is remote from the USSR and which would be a logistic drain for Moscow were the USSR to commit itself there much more deeply.

26. In addition, Vietnam already suffers from labor shortages that increased military conscription would aggravate, and Hanoi confronts a very serious situation in agriculture. The Vietnamese economy is already sufficiently stretched that additional burdens would have a telling impact, forcing Moscow to make another decision about greatly increasing its support. The major risk inherent in using any such approach as this against Vietnam would be that in the immediate future it might provoke the Vietnamese to continue to build their already formidable army. This prospect and the increased turmoil within Vietnam would hold little appeal for most of the ASEAN countries. But it should be noted that the ASEAN countries would not be comfortable with either this approach or one that was more "dependence reduction" in character.

27. An "attrition" approach was used in Eastern Europe by the United States without great success during the early years of the Cold War and was replaced by a more or less limited "dependence reduction" approach in the late 1960s and 1970s. This approach has been modestly successful in helping wean the East European countries--especially Poland and Rumania--away from the USSR and in reducing the cohesiveness of the Warsaw Pact. The continuation of a "dependency reduction" approach would seem

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appropriate except in the case of Poland. That country has reached a new stage, one which calls for a fresh look.

28. At this time in the case of Poland the "dependence reduction" measures, such as the extension of further loans to Warsaw and the provision of food and investment, still serve to provide the country with alternatives to complete dependence on the USSR. However, complete reliance on an approach such as this might carry with it certain disadvantages:

- It would have inherent limitations because the USSR is unwilling to permit Poland to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact or CEMA, and remains able to subdue Poland's centrifugal tendencies whenever it decides to do so.
- Large-scale Western assistance to Poland that eases conditions there would reduce costs to the USSR as well, particularly by reducing turmoil in the country.
- It would be a very expensive and open-ended set of activities.
- It would place brakes on Western willingness to initiate activist measures elsewhere lest the USSR use these as an excuse to invade Poland.

29. In contrast, an "attrition" approach, including anti-Soviet propaganda and various forms of assistance and encouragement to anti-Soviet elements in the Polish labor and agricultural sectors, would serve to help keep the pot boiling in Eastern Europe. In that case Moscow would continue to fear ideological contamination in the Bloc, and must continue to confront the very thorny choice between ending liberalization in Poland by military means (and suffering enormous political damage as well as having to underwrite the Polish economy in the process) or risking further damage to the fabric of the Bloc.

30. A Soviet invasion of Poland would significantly raise the possibility of a superpower confrontation. It might well also endanger the prospects for arms control and create a situation that would benefit neither superpower (although, ultimately, the combination of growing strains on the Soviet economy and military modernization in Western Europe might make arms control once again a desirable prospect for Moscow). To reduce the danger of a Soviet invasion, a mixed approach might prove rewarding. Poland could be given assistance which would be sufficient to prevent total economic collapse but which would be insufficient to resolve Warsaw's acute economic difficulties, thereby maintaining centrifugal tendencies in that country. At

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the same time, the encouragement of nationalist and anti-Soviet elements in the country would produce embarrassment for Moscow and force the Soviet Union to forgo other opportunities as it continues to wrestle with the Polish problem.

31. Conversely, a Soviet invasion of Poland might serve US interests in certain ways:

- It would remove the Polish "hostage" on US behavior and justify stronger US measures in other regions, such as in Central America.
- It would, at least initially, tend to unify the Western alliance and weaken opposition to NATO modernization.
- It would justify increased investment in defense by the West.
- It probably would weaken Soviet influence in the Third World and reduce pacifist and neutralist sentiments in Europe.
- It would be very costly in economic resource terms for the Soviets to subdue Poland.

32. South Yemen is a case where neither of the approaches seems feasible, and it may be prudent for the United States to do little. The chances of raising the costs to the Soviets through a basically "attrition" approach seem slim at best. The government and its various factions are strongly pro-Soviet, and there appear to be no significant local dissidents. The neighboring countries of North Yemen and Oman, although hostile to Aden, lack the capability to take offensive actions against South Yemen. The "dependence reduction" mode is of little value because the South Yemeni Government has little or no interest in improving its relations with the West or in obtaining economic assistance from it.

33. In the case of Libya, the foregoing approaches also might avail little. The "dependence reduction" approach is not easily imaginable. Libya already depends on the West for much of its economic modernization efforts and for markets for its oil. The success of such an approach depends on the sort of long-term cost-benefit calculus that is conspicuously absent in the adventurism of Qadhafi. A largely "attrition" approach would also seem improvident given the large sums Qadhafi has at his disposal to continue his international subversion.

34. The problem, however, is too important for the United States to remain a passive onlooker. Libya clearly is a significant element in Soviet expansionary and disruptive global activities, although it is by no means dependent on the USSR or a

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puppet on a Moscow string. Indeed, the Soviets lean more heavily on Qadhafi than vice versa. In their symbiotic relationship, the Soviets receive considerable hard currency and a proxy (often unguided) in Africa and the Middle East in return for a nearly unrestricted flow of conventional arms and military assistance. The Libyan regime is synonymous with international terrorism, and its adventurism has surfaced in areas as diverse as Chad, the Philippines, and the United States. Any concerted approach directed against Libya, therefore, would be more feasible the more it sought to dislodge the Soviets and their Libyan clients rather than merely raising the costs for Moscow in any direct fashion.

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